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Abstract
We propose a model of rating agencies that is an application of global game theory in which
heterogeneous investors act strategically. The model allows us to explore the impact of the
introduction of a rating agency on ﬁnancial markets. Our model suggests that the addition of
the rating agency aﬀects the probability of default and the magnitude of the response of capital
ﬂows to changes in fundamentals in a non–trivial way, and that introducing a rating agency can
bring multiple equilibria to a market that otherwise would have the unique equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
Credit ratings are an important component of both international and domestic ﬁnancial markets
and their role has been steadily growing over time. The number of countries that have received a
credit rating increased from about a dozen in 1980 to about a hundred in 2002.1 Similar growth has
occurred in U.S. markets: In 2002, Moody’s rated about 20,000 public and private bond issuers,
up from 5,500 in 1975 (Partnoy 2002). In this paper, we take a step towards understanding the
eﬀect of the increasing importance of rating agencies on ﬁnancial markets by applying a theory of
coordination amongst investors. In particular, we analyze the eﬀect of the introduction of a rating
agency on the probability of default by the borrower, the reaction of ﬁnancial markets to changing
fundamentals in short and long run, and the set of parameters supporting a unique equilibrium in
ﬁnancial markets.
Empirical studies of rating agencies have found that one way that rating agencies aﬀect ﬁnancial
markets is by aﬀecting borrowers’ costs. Several studies, such as Ammer (1998) and Cantor and
Packer (1996) who analyze yields of a cross–section of bonds, and Clark and Lakshmi (2003) who
focus on a particular episode in detail, have found a signiﬁcant impact of credit rating announce-
ments on sovereign bond spreads. Additionally, movements in sovereign credit ratings have been
found to aﬀect the prices of other ﬁnancial instruments, including equity markets (Kaminsky and
Schmukler 2002), and the price of sovereign debt of other countries (Gande and Parsley 2002).
Studies of corporate debt markets in the United States have also found evidence of the eﬀect of
actions by rating agencies. One example is Kliger and Sarig (2000), who ﬁnd that the Moody’s
announcement of reﬁnements of its ratings system in 1982 raised or lowered the price of debt of
companies depending on whether their rating was increased or decreased by the reﬁnement.
Credit ratings can also inﬂuence investors’ portfolio holdings. Some institutional borrowers, such
as mutual funds, are constrained to hold only securities that rating agencies have certiﬁed as
investment grade (International Monetary Fund 1999). Under the Basel II capital accords, the
eﬀect of rating agencies on investor portfolios is likely to grow further as the role credit ratings play
1As of today, Moody’s and Standard and Poors provide ratings for over 100 countries each, while twenty years
ago only 11 sovereigns were rated by Standard and Poors (Ferri, Liu, and Majnoni 2000).
2in risk management practices increases.2
Some scholars have discussed whether an increase in the role of credit ratings might make lending
more procyclical as downgraded debt would require more capital and a creditor’s ability to lend
would be curtailed at times when monetary authorities are trying to ease ﬁnancial conditions (Blum
and Hellwig 1995, Carpenter, Whitesell, and Zakrajsek 2001). There has also been a debate in the
empirical literature about whether the credit ratings issued by rating agencies themselves move
procyclically and might exacerbate a boom or a bust (Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz 1999, Reisen and
Maltzan 1998).
There has been some theoretical work involving rating agencies, but, to the best of our knowledge,
most of this literature does not deal with the eﬀects of rating agencies on the equilibria reached by
ﬁnancial markets. The majority of work involving rating agencies has focused on the development
of markets for information. Millon and Thakor (1985) develop a model explaining why information
gatherers would group together in a ﬁrm and why this ﬁrm would have a ﬁnite size. Allen (1990)
presents a model exploring why markets for information might exist. Laster, Bennett, and Geoum
(1999) discuss the incentives for analysts to announce their true forecasts. One recent paper that
does explore the eﬀect of rating agencies on ﬁnancial markets is by Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits
(2004). In their paper, the authors argue that, if some investors base their lending decisions largely
on the announcements of rating agencies, then rating agencies can act to discipline ﬁrms. However,
in their paper, it is not always clear that investors are taking full advantage of the information
available to them or how economic fundamentals aﬀect rating agencies’ announcements and thus
the equilibrium.
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects of rating agencies on ﬁnancial markets using a global game
model.3 In the model, investors receive imperfect and heterogeneous private information regarding
the ability of a borrower to repay its debt and make their decision about whether to extend a new
loan based on their information and their expectations about the behavior of other investors. When
the rating agency announces its assessment of the borrower’s creditworthiness, investors incorporate
2Concerns about using credit rating to assess risks have been raised in the literature, by Danielsson, Embrechts,
Goodhart, Keating, Muennich, Renault, and Shin (2001) and Kraussl (2003), among others.
3See survey by Morris and Shin (2003) and also Goldstein and Pauzner (2003).
3the agency’s assessment into their own forecast. Thus, the agency provides a focal point toward
which the investors’ beliefs gravitate and also causes investors to revise their expectations regarding
what other investors will do. As a result, the agency aﬀects the amount of debt the borrower is able
to roll-over and the probability of default. This global games setup provides a useful framework
because it speciﬁes an explicit role for an economic fundamental, investor’s private information
about the fundamental and beliefs about other agents, and the public signal provided by the rating
agency. Thus it is relatively easy to observe the interactions of these elements.
This paper is primarily an application of the global games theory to a particular situation. We
analyze the implications of this model in ways not fully explored in the literature and show how it
can be useful in understanding the role rating agencies play in ﬁnancial markets. We refer to the
borrower in the model as a sovereign, and most of the empirical work cited in the paper relates
to international ﬁnancial markets and sovereign debt ratings; however, the general structure and
implications of the model are applicable to corporate markets as well.
The model indicates that the eﬀect the rating agency on ﬁnancial markets depends, among other
parameters, on the characteristics of the borrower. Speciﬁcally, for high quality borrowers, the
introduction of a rating agency tends to increase the average probability of default. This is because
a bad rating announcement worsens investors’ beliefs on average by more than a good rating
announcement improves them. The opposite is true for lower quality borrowers. Our model also
predicts that the addition of the rating agency is stabilizing in a sense that it decreases swings
in capital ﬂows in response to long–run changes in fundamentals. This is due to the fact that,
without the rating agency, posterior beliefs about fundamentals are more disperse and, for the
relevant range of parameters, this implies that a larger share of investors will change their behavior
in response to changes in fundamentals. The eﬀects of short–run changes in fundamentals are more
complex.
Finally, the model suggests that a credit rating is likely to increase the likelihood of multiple
equilibiria, i.e. the constraint that ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium is tighter if the rating
agency is introduced. In the case of multiple equilibria, if the rating agency announces some measure
of default probability, which is not unique, this signal can be used by investors to coordinate on
4one equilibrium or the other. However, if the rating agency is announcing its belief about the
fundamentals, as in the main setup of the model, the equilibrium selection is still undetermined.
It should be recognized that our model does not take into account some important attributes of
rating agencies that also likely aﬀect the impact of rating agencies on market outcomes, such as
the fact that they reduce the cost of information acquisition and thus increase the pool of potential
borrowers. Nevertheless, we believe that our model provides a useful framework for examining the
eﬀect that rating agencies have on ﬁnancial markets and does point to some potential trade-oﬀs
connected with the use of credit ratings.
The paper is organized as follows. In part two, we present a model of debt roll–over without a
rating agency. In part three, we introduce the rating agency and analyze how its introduction
aﬀects the market equilibrium, especially default probability, the response of capital ﬂows to shifts
in fundamentals, and the likelihood of multiple equilibria. Part four concludes.
2 Model
We start by presenting a benchmark model without a credit rating agency in which imperfectly
informed investors decide whether to roll over the debt of a sovereign government based on their
own assessments of the sovereign’s ability to repay (which reﬂects economic fundamentals) and on
their expectations of the actions of the other investors. This model is a basic version of a global
game model, as described in Morris and Shin (2004).
We assume that the sovereign government has an outstanding amount of one period debt that it
wishes to rollover. We normalize the size of this stock to be equal to 1. The government debt is
held by N risk–neutral investors with mass c each, thus Nc = 1. We assume here that investors are
atomistic. We will later assume that N ! 1 and analyze the version of the model with continuum
of investors with mass 1.4
The government can and is willing to repay an exogenous share µ of this debt while the remaining
amount of debt (1¡µ) needs to be rolled over. One could think of µ as a measure of the economic
4For a model with big players, see Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004).
5fundamentals of the sovereign country’s economy. Stronger fundamentals lead to more economic
growth providing the government with a larger revenue base and bolstering its ability to repay its
debts.
Each investor decides individually whether or not to roll over her unit of debt and there is no
cooperation among investors.5 Denote investor i’s decision di: di = 1 if investor i decides to roll
over her unit of debt and di = 0 otherwise. The total amount of debt that will be rolled over is
then
D = c
N X
i=1
di;
which implies that D 2 [0;1].
If the investor decides not to roll over her unit of debt, she can withdraw it without any premium
or punishment and invest it in a risk–free asset with gross return normalized to 1.6 If she decides
to roll over her debt, she forgoes the opportunity of withdrawing money and investing in a risk–free
assets and instead receives a gross return of R > 1 if there is no default.7;8
If an insuﬃcient number of investors roll over their debt holdings, i.e. D < 1 ¡ µ, the country is
forced to default on its debt and none of the investors that rolled over their holdings of debt are
paid. This implicitly assumes that a country bears costs of default that are ﬁxed and independent
of the amount of debt defaulted, and that the country does not build long–run relationships with
investors. Under these conditions it will be optimal for the country to always default on the entire
5To keep the emphasis of the paper on the rating agency, we do not discuss bargaining or cooperation between
the government and investors, or among the investors. See Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989) for a model with bargaining.
The assumption that debt roll–over is ﬁnanced by investors that currently hold the stock of debt is not essential. The
model can be easily reinterpreted for the case when new investors choose between sovereign debt and risk–free assets.
6In this model we assume that those who want to withdraw their money can always do it before the draw of µ
occurs. We will not focus on how this is ﬁnanced.
7Again, we do not specify how the premium is ﬁnanced. Potentially economic growth, as reﬂected by µ, would
allow the country to repay part of the debt while the remainder is ﬁnanced by future debt rollovers. This is sustainable
as long as the growth of revenue is greater than or equal to the growth of interest payments.
8In our model it is implicit that default is not economically desirable, which is in contrast with Chang (2002).
6debt stock.9 Thus, the payoﬀ structure for investors is as follows:
ui(di;d¡i;µ) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
R if di = 1 & D ¸ (1 ¡ µ);
0 if di = 1 & D < (1 ¡ µ);
1 if di = 0;
(1)
where d¡i are decisions made by other investors.
This payoﬀ structure implies that investors will choose to roll over the debt if and only if they
believe that
Prob(D ¸ 1 ¡ µ)R ¸ 1: (2)
Suppose that at the time of the investors’ roll–over decisions µ is not known. Assume however, that
it is public knowledge that the realization will be drawn from a normal distribution with mean ¿
and variance ¾. The apriori probability 1 ¡ p of being repayed is
1 ¡ p = Prob(D ¸ 1 ¡ µ) = Φ(
1
p
¾
(D ¡ 1 + ¿)); (3)
where Φ is standard normal CDF, and p is the probability of default.
Our assumptions imply that if µ < 0, there will be a default unless “new money” is injected. In
our model, we do not allow for this possibility, therefore there will always be default if µ < 0,
and therefore not rolling over the debt (d = 0) is a dominant strategy for every investor in this
case.10 Likewise, if µ > 1, the default will not occur even if D = 0, because the government can
repay all the debt from its own resources, thus rolling over the debt (d = 1) is a dominant strategy
in this case. We focus our attention on the equilibria with µ 2 (0;1), which will depend on the
information structure regarding µ; however, as shown in Morris and Shin (2003), the dominance
regions described are necessary for the existence of the unique equilibrium.
9These assumptions, while unrealistic, are not driving our results but simplify the model presentation.
10To make the model work, all we really need is that there is some amount of borrowing beyond which the
government is unable to repay the debt and will default. This notion seems quite realistic. Specifying that there is
no new money simpliﬁes notation.
72.1 Full information
If the share of debt that the government can repay, µ, is common knowledge to all investors, then
there are two symmetric equilibria in which either D = 0 or D = 1. Both are self–fulﬁlling and
can occur at any level of µ 2 (0;1). There are also inﬁnitely many non–symmetric equilibria (see
Morris and Shin (2004)). This multiplicity will disappear as we introduce imperfect heterogeneous
signals and strategic behavior.11
This perfect information set–up is frequently a benchmark model for thinking about the investor
coordination. With perfect information on can think of the role of credit rating agencies being
to help investors coordinate on one of the two equilibria, which then implies that credit rating
agencies could be responsible for swings in international capital ﬂows. We will see from the model
below that some of this coordination eﬀect is present when we allow for imperfect information and
heterogeneous beliefs. We now turn to the model with a unique equilibrium.
2.2 Private signals
Suppose now that in addition to their proper common prior about µ » N(¿;¾), investors get private
noisy signals about µ. Denote investors i’s signal ˜ µi:
˜ µi = µ + "i; "i » N
µ
0;
1
¯
¶
;
where ¯ is the precision of private signal. This gives us investor i’s posterior belief about µ, µi:
µi » N
Ã
° ¿ + ¯ ˜ µi
° + ¯
;
1
° + ¯
!
;
where we denoted the precision of the prior 1=¾ as °. We will assume that only investor i observes
her signal ˜ µi, while ¯ is common knowledge.
This posterior distribution of beliefs about µ gives us a unique equilibrium if private signals are
suﬃciently informative as compared to the prior, ¯ ¸
°2
2¼.12 In what follows, we assume that this
11The same logic applies if all investors get the same noisy signal about µ and this signal is common knowledge.
12See Morris and Shin (2004) for the proof in a similar setting.
8condition holds. We return to the question of uniqueness later in the paper.
The unique equilibrium can then be described by the threshold level of µ below which there will
be a default in equilibrium, because fewer than 1 ¡ µ investors will choose to roll over their debt.
Above that level, a suﬃcient number of investors will choose to roll over the debt and there will
be no default. This unique level of µ should be consistent with the belief of a pivotal investor who
is indiﬀerent between rolling over debt and not doing so. We denote this equilibrium threshold of
µ as µ¤. The equilibrium in this model, µ¤, is a switching point such that the fundamental µ ¸ µ¤
results in a successful roll–over, while µ < µ¤ results in default.13
Proposition 1 (Morris and Shin 2004) Given the information structure above, and if ¯ ¸
°2
2¼, the
equilibrium is unique and µ¤ is implicitly determined by
µ¤ = Φ
µ
1
p
¯
·
°(µ¤ ¡ ¿) +
p
° + ¯ Φ¡1
µ
1
R
¶¸¶
(4)
and is 2 (0;1). In addition, @µ¤=@¿ < 0, @µ¤=@R < 0.
Proof. Follows from Morris and Shin (2004). Signs of the derivatives are obvious.
For convenience, we will denote Φ¡1 ¡ 1
R
¢
as ½ in what follows. It will be useful to keep in mind that
½ > 0 , R 2 (1;2) and ½ < 0 , R > 2.14 For the rest of the paper we typically start with the
assumption that ½ > 0 (R < 2), but, where results depend on ½, we discuss the case where ½ < 0.
We are most interested in the actual probability of default, p¤. This is equal to the probability that
actual µ will be below the threshold µ¤.
p¤ = Prob(µ < µ¤) = Fµ(µ¤) = Φ(°(µ¤ ¡ ¿));
which is monotonically increasing in µ¤. Therefore for any variable ², sign(@µ¤=@²) = sign(@p¤=@²).
We can see from Proposition 1 that the probability of default is lower if ¿ is higher and if R is higher.
Both better fundamentals and a higher spread (R ¡ 1) on sovereign debt increase the incentives
13Since for any 0 < µ < µ
¤ there will be default in equilibrium, and this default would not occur if all investors
could coordinate on rolling over the debt, µ
¤ could be interpreted as a measure of ineﬃciency due to coordination
failure.
14Note that R = 2 corresponds to 100 percentage points spread over the risk–free rate which we normalized to be
equal to 1.
9to rolling over the debt and therefore more investors choose to do so, which in turn lowers the
probability of default. In addition, better fundamentals lower the probability of default for a given
number of investors willing to roll over the debt.
3 The rating agency
In this section we introduce the rating agency and then show how it aﬀects the equilibrium: through
its eﬀect on the probability of default, volatility of capital ﬂows, and the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium.
3.1 Model with a rating agency
Suppose now that there is a rating agency that has the same prior about fundamentals as all the
investors and receives a signal ˜ µA with noise º that has mean 0 and precision ®.15
˜ µA = µ + º; º » N
µ
0;
1
®
¶
:
We will assume that only the rating agency observes ˜ µA but ® is common knowledge. Suppose
that the agency directly announces its signal ˜ µA and investors then update their common prior
accordingly. The new prior has mean
µA ´
° ¿ + ® ˜ µA
° + ®
and variance 1=(° + ®). We will assume that investors get the same private signals as before, and
therefore the new posterior beliefs µA
i are distributed
µA
i » N
Ã
° ¿ + ® ˜ µA + ¯ ˜ µi
° + ® + ¯
;
1
° + ® + ¯
!
: (5)
15The three rating agencies report that they base their sovereign ratings largely on economic fundamentals (Fitch
1998, Moody’s 1999, Standard and Poor’s 2002).
10Now for the equilibrium to be unique, we have to impose a stricter condition on ¯. While before it
was necessary and suﬃcient that ¯ ¸
°2
2¼, now it is necessary that ¯ ¸
(°+®)2
2¼ >
°2
2¼ if ® > 0. This
gives us the ﬁrst eﬀect that introducing rating agency can have:
Proposition 2 For ¯ 2
h
°2
2¼;
(°+®)2
2¼
´
, there is a unique equilibrium in the absence of a rating
agency and multiple equilibria if a rating agency is introduced.
Proof. Follows from Morris and Shin (2004) with ® replaced by ° + ®.
In other words, if private signals are precise enough to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium in the
absence of a rating agency, but not precise enough relative to the precision of the agency’s signal,
introducing a rating agency will lead to multiplicity of equilibria. We will ﬁrst focus on the case
where a unique equilibrium exists both with and without the rating agency, i.e. ¯ ¸
(°+®)2
2¼ . We
will return to the issue of multiplicity in section 3.4.
Proposition 3 (Morris and Shin 2004) Given the information structure above and ¯ ¸
(°+®)2
2¼ ,
the equilibrium is unique and µA¤ is implicitly determined by
µA¤ = Φ
µ
1
p
¯
³
(° + ®)µA¤ ¡ ° ¿ ¡ ® ˜ µA +
p
° + ® + ¯ ½
´¶
(6)
and is 2 (0;1). In addition, @µA¤=@˜ µA < 0, @µA¤=@¿ < 0, @µA¤=@R < 0.
Proof. Follows from Morris and Shin (2004). Signs of derivatives are obvious.
The probability of default is now
p¤ = Prob(µ < µ¤) = Fµ(µA¤) = Φ(°(µA¤ ¡ ¿));
as before, the probability of default is lower if the prior mean of µ, ¿, is higher or the spread R¡1
is higher. It is worth noting that µA¤, and thus the probability of default, depend on the rating
agency’s signal, which depends in turn on º (the error in the agencies signal). As one might expect,
a positive º (a high assessment by the agency) lowers the probability of default. This additional
sensitivity, however, is a notable eﬀect of the introduction of the rating agency and, as will be
shown below, has important implications for the equilibrium reached in the model.
11We now turn to our analysis of the eﬀect the introduction of the rating agency has on the equilib-
rium, assuming the equilibrium is unique both with and without the rating agency.
3.2 Eﬀects of rating agency on the probability of default
We ﬁrst examine how the addition of the rating agency aﬀects the probability of default. Since,
as noted above, the probability of default with the rating agency depends in a non–linear way on
two random variables (µ and º), and we only have an implicit solution for µ¤, we have to resort to
numeric methods in this analysis.
We can analyze the eﬀects of the rating agency on the ex-post probability of default, i.e. for a
given ¿ we analyze the eﬀects for each particular realization of µ while taking the expectation
over the distribution of º in the case with a rating agency. We will refer to this as a short–run
eﬀect, interpreting random realizations of µ as short–run changes in fundamentals. We can also
analyze the eﬀect of the addition of the rating agency on the ex–ante probability of default (i.e the
expectation over the distributions of µ and º), where we interpret changes in ¿ itself as long–run
changes in fundamentals.
The eﬀects of introducing a rating agency on the probability of default ex–ante and ex-post are
illustrated in Figure 1. The left–hand panel represents the eﬀects of the rating agency on the
probability of default as a function of long–run fundamentals. We observe that the addition of
the rating agency increases the likelihood of default for borrowers with high ¿ (good long–run
fundamentals) and reduces the likelihood of default for borrowers with lower ¿. The point at which
the switch occurs moves to the left as R increases, as illustrated in the Appendix. The results
are otherwise robust to a variety of parameter values, although for some sets of parameters the
diﬀerences in the probability of default with and without a rating agency are quite small.
The intuition for this result is that for the high ¿ borrowers, the increase in the probability of default
from a low rating is not fully oﬀset by the beneﬁt of getting a high rating. To see this, assume that
if the rating agency’s announcement is 0, D0 investors will roll over the debt. With high ¿, this
D0 > 0:5, and the pivotal investor is located on the upward sloping part of the PDF of the posterior
12Long run
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Figure 1: Probability of default with (pa) and without (pn) a rating agency as a function of ¿ and
as a function of µ (with ¿ = 0:5) for ® = ¯ = ° = 1, R = 2
beliefs.16 If the rating announcement is positive, this PDF will shift to the right and additional
Dg of investors will now choose to roll over the debt. If the rating announcement is negative (but
the same in absolute value), the posterior distribution will shift (by the same amount) to the left.
Now, Db of investors that would roll over the debt with zero rating, will no longer choose to do so.
Since D0 was on the upward part of the posterior distribution PDF, Db > Dg. Thus, the change
in investors’ posterior beliefs is larger in absolute value when the rating agency’s announcement
is unfavorable than when it is favorable. Thus, on average, for the high level of ¿, a credit rating
lowers D and therefore, increases the probability of default.
The reverse intuition holds for borrowers with low ¿. For R = 2, the switch occurs at ¿ = 0:5. For
very low levels of R the probability of default is always lower with the rating agency than without,
while for very high levels of R, the probability of default is always higher with the rating agency
than without. The ex–ante (long run) eﬀect of a credit rating on the probability of default as a
function of R for ¿ = 0:5 is represented in Figure 2.
Thus, borrowers with poor initial fundamentals are likely to beneﬁt, in terms of default probability,
from obtaining a credit rating. However, if the spreads are high, the set of the borrowers that
beneﬁt is small. On the other hand, if spreads are low, most borrowers, including those with rather
good fundamentals, will beneﬁt from obtaining a credit rating.
In the short run, represented on the right–hand panel of Figure 1, the eﬀect of introducing the
16All investors with better beliefs choose to roll over their debt.
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Figure 2: Probability of default with (pa) and without (pn) a rating agency as a function of R for
® = ¯ = ° = 1, ¿ = 0:5
rating agency is qualitatively the same as in the long run, only with a much larger quantitative
eﬀect. Without the rating agency, µ¤ is completely determined by the parameters of the model
and thus the probability of default is 0 for µ > µ¤ and is 1 for µ < µ¤. With the rating agency,
the probability of default depends also on the rating announcement, which itself depends on the
realizations of µ and º (over which we take an expectation), thus, the probability of default is a
smooth function of µ for a given ¿. This eﬀect of the rating agency can be interpreted as stabilizing,
since small changes in the realization of fundamentals do not have large impacts on the outcome, as
happens in the case without the rating agency. On the other hand, while the probability of default
is 0 for some µ without the rating agency, it is always positive in a presence of a credit rating.
3.3 Eﬀects of the rating agency on the response to changes in fundamentals
While our model is not a dynamic one, comparative statics do oﬀer some insight into how the
addition of the rating agency aﬀects investors’ response to a change in economic fundamentals. It
has been argued in the empirical literature that rating agencies aﬀect the volatility of capital ﬂows.
One way to examine this in our model is to analyze how introducing a rating agency aﬀects the
response of the share of investors who choose to roll over the debt to changes in fundamentals:
@D=@¿ in the long run, or @D=@µ for a given ¿ in the short run.
This share, D, depends on the equilibrium threshold µ¤, on the realization of µ, and, if there is a
rating agency, on the realization of rating agency’s signal, i.e. realization of º for each µ. It can
14be derived explicitly once we know µ¤.17 A pivotal investor is indiﬀerent between rolling over the
debt and withdrawing his money, i.e. for her
1 ¡ ˜ p =
1
R
;
where ˜ p is the estimate of default probability that is based on this investor’s posterior belief about
the realization of µ.
˜ p = Φ
Ã
p
® + ¯ + °
Ã
µ¤ ¡
® ˜ µA + ¯ ˜ µ + ° ¿
® + ¯ + °
!!
;
which we can solve to recover the signal ˜ µ that this pivotal investor received.
® ˜ µA + ¯ ˜ µ + ° ¿
® + ¯ + °
= µ¤ +
½
p
® + ¯ + °
;
˜ µ =
® + ¯ + °
¯
µ
µ¤ +
½
p
® + ¯ + °
¶
¡
® ˜ µA + ° ¿
¯
:
Once we know the signal that the pivotal investor received, we know that all the investors with a
better signal will roll over the debt, while all the investors with a lower signal will withdraw their
money. Thus, D is just the CDF over the distribution of investors’ signals, which has mean µ and
variance 1=¯.
D = 1 ¡ Φ
³p
¯(˜ µ ¡ µ)
´
:
We will ﬁrst analyze the ex–ante eﬀect of changes in ¿ on the capital ﬂows, i.e. we again will be
taking the expectation of D over the distribution of µ and º. The share of investors that roll over
their debt in the absence of a rating agency can be obtained by setting ® = 0 in the derivations
above.
The results of our simulations are presented in Figure 3.18 Again, qualitative predictions are robust
with respect to changes in parameter values as can be seen in the Appendix. One can immediately
see that in the long run (in response to the changes in ¿) the share of investors that choose to roll
over the debt mirrors the behavior of the default probability. This is not a coincidence: if the share
17In fact, it is derived in the process of ﬁnding µ
¤.
18We still have to use numeric methods to calculate µ
¤.
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Figure 3: Debt roll–over with (D) and without (Dn) a rating agency, and the change in debt
roll–over with (dD) and without (dDn) a rating agency in response to changes in ¿ and in µ (for
¿ = 0:5), with ® = ¯ = ° = 1, R = 2
of investors that choose to roll over their debt is higher, default is less likely to occur.
Here we are more interested in the magnitude of the response of capital ﬂows to changes in funda-
mentals, thus, the right–hand axis shows the percentage changes in D as a result of an incremental
changes in ¿ (by 0.1). We ﬁnd that in the long run, the response of capital ﬂows to changes in
fundamentals is always lower with the rating agency, but that the diﬀerence is smaller when the
fundamentals (¿) are better, as depicted on the left–hand panel of the Figure 3.
The reason for this result is that posterior beliefs are more dispersed in the absence of a credit
rating, i.e. the distribution of posterior beliefs in the absence of the rating agency has fatter tails.
For poor fundamentals only the investors in the upper tail of the posterior distribution decide to
roll over the debt, since the tails are thinner with the rating agency, fewer investors change their
decision in response to a change in ¿.19 As ¿ improves, however, investors closer to the middle of
distribution start rolling over their debt and at some point further improvement in fundamentals
would have a larger eﬀect with the rating agency than without. This point, however, is not reached
for ¿ 2 [0;1] for the sets of parameters we analyzed. Presumably, if R increases further, this eﬀect
will eventually be reversed for the very high ¿.
Thus, we ﬁnd that the introduction of a rating agency can have a stabilizing eﬀect on capital ﬂows
by reducing their response to long–run changes in fundamentals, and that this is especially true
for the borrowers with worse long–run fundamentals. In addition, this stabilizing eﬀect is more
19Note that a change in ¿ shifts the posterior distribution by the same amount with and without the rating agency.
16pronounced when the spreads are relatively low.
The right–hand panel of Figure 3 presents the eﬀects of the rating agency on the response of capital
ﬂows to the short–run volatility in fundamentals. Here, the eﬀect is reversed: the introduction of
the rating agency actually makes capital ﬂows more responsive to the short run changes in µ. This
reversal occurs because the threshold µ¤ is not aﬀected by the changes in the realization of µ in
the absence of a rating agency but is aﬀected when rating agency is present, through the rating
announcement. This ampliﬁes the impact of the changes in fundamentals on the equilibrium.
However, there is also a direct eﬀect of the changes in µ on D which is larger without the rating
agency, due to the fact that the posterior distribution is more dispersed. This direct eﬀect can
more than compensate for the additional eﬀect of the changes in the rating announcement on µ¤.
Consequently, as Appendix 2 shows, the result that capital ﬂows are more responsive in the short
run to changes in µ, when the agency is present, depends on the levels of R and ¿. In particular,
it holds for low and high levels of R, while for the intermediate levels of R, it depends on ¿.
3.4 Multiplicity versus uniqueness of equilibrium
Until now, we have focused on the situation where the equilibrium has been unique. In order to
ensure uniqueness, we had to assume that the condition on the precision of private signals relative
to that of public information held: in particular, ¯ ¸ (° + ®)2=2¼. This condition requires that
private information be rather precise relative to the rating agency’s information. In fact, as shown
on Figure 4, if ® ¸ 4, and ° = 1, uniqueness requires that ¯ > ®, i.e. private signals that carry
information in addition to that present in the common prior and the rating agency’s announcement,
are more precise than the rating agency’s announcement. This is not usually the way we think about
the quality of information, given that rating agencies are in the business of gathering, analyzing
and supplying information.
If we think of the original common prior as easily available information, such as news media, it is not
unrealistic to think that the information obtained by the analysts of rating agencies is much more
precise. Indeed, the reason that investors make use of credit ratings is because they believe that
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Figure 4: ®, ¯ and uniqueness condition (shaded area) for ° = 1
rating agencies have better access to information and therefore their information is more accurate.20
While a unique equilibrium may be easily achieved in the absence of a rating agency, it is much
less likely to be achieved when a rating agency is introduced. If uniqueness is not achieved, instead
of the single equilibrium, there will be three: two stable equilibria and one unstable equilibrium.
With multiple equilibria, the volatility of capital ﬂows may be increased further as shifts in credit
ratings may trigger jumps from one equilibrium to another.
The switch from a situation with a unique equilibrium to multiple equilibria due to the introduction
of a rating agency is illustrated in Figure 5. Equilibrium E is the unique equilibrium in the absence
of the rating agency. When the rating agency is introduced, the equilibrium will shift to either of
the stable equilibria (A or C) unless equilibrium E is exactly equal to the unstable equilibrium B.
In the case illustrated in Figure 5, µ¤ is high enough that the equilibrium converges to C, with a
higher probability of default. This need not be the case in general. For some initial µ¤, the addition
of the rating agency will shift the equilibrium to A, in which case the addition of the rating agency
lowers the probability of default in equilibrium. In this latter scenario, moving from E to A, a
credit rating indeed gives “courage” to capital by increasing capital ﬂows and thus, lowering the
20What really matters for the model is not whether the rating agency’s information is actually more accurate, but
instead that investors believe that the rating agency’s information is more accurate.
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Figure 5: Equilibria (equations (4) and (6)) with and without a rating agency
probability of default. However, this improvement comes at a cost — changes in ratings may shift
the equilibrium to the one with higher probability of default.21
In our setup, rating agencies announce their beliefs about economic fundamentals. This is somewhat
unrealistic, since rating agencies typically announce a rating that corresponds to the likelihood that
the sovereign (or some other borrower) will default. If the rating agency announces its expectation
of the equilibrium default probability and there is a unique equilibrium, this equilibrium will be the
same as when the agency announces its beliefs about fundamentals, provided the investors know
what the agency is doing, because investors can always back out the information on which the
rating agency is basing its announcement.
In case of multiple equilibria, however, the rating agency would have to choose whether to announce
the default probability that corresponds to a good equilibrium or the one that corresponds to a
bad equilibrium. It can then serve as a self–fulﬁlling equilibrium selection mechanism — investors
will coordinate on the equilibrium that corresponds to the announced credit rating. This ability to
select a self–fulﬁlling equilibrium arguably gives the rating agency a lot of inﬂuence on the markets;
and it could give rise to the disciplinary ability of the rating agency described by Boot, Milbourn,
and Schmeits (2004), or to an opportunity to “blackmail” the borrower being rated.22 Our model
21Furthermore, Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2003) show that allowing the rating agency to act strategically
(while limiting its action space) might lead to multiple equilibria even if the condition on ¯ is satisﬁed. This gives
us an additional reason to believe that introducing a rating agency into a coordination game might lead to multiple
equilibria.
22As was insinuated in a series of articles published in The Washington Post between November 22 and November
24, 2004.
19suggests that with multiple equilibria the ability to leverage the impact of their announcement is a
possibility for rating agencies, even if the investors are quite sophisticated.
4 Conclusion
We use a global game model of sovereign debt roll–over to analyze the eﬀects of introducing a
rating agency to ﬁnancial markets. The credit rating agency aﬀects the equilibrium by aﬀecting
investors individual assessment of the condition of the borrower and the investors’ beliefs about
the actions of other borrowers. While the model is formulated with sovereign debt in mind, it can
be directly applied to corporate debt roll–over with a rating agency. The diﬀerence will be in the
interpretation of “fundamentals”.
We ﬁnd that the addition of the rating agency increases the probability of default for the borrowers
with good fundamentals and lowers it for the borrowers with poor fundamentals in the long and
short run, reduces the magnitude of the response in capital ﬂows to long–run changes in fundamen-
tals, and can increase or reduce the magnitude of the response in capital ﬂows to short–run changes
in fundamentals. In addition, the introduction of a rating agency may decrease market stability
by giving rise to situations in which multiple equilibria exist so that markets respond sharply to
changes in beliefs.
It is important to emphasize that this paper is by no means a complete cost–beneﬁt analysis of
the role rating agencies play in ﬁnancial markets. We merely point out some potential costs and
beneﬁts that can arise from introducing a rating agency in a coordination game by heterogeneous
investors. One additional channel through which rating agencies aﬀect markets is by reducing the
cost of collecting information, which could also have important implications for how rating agencies
aﬀect ﬁnancial markets. We attempt such analysis in a related project, still in progress.
The model can also serve as a stepping stone for many other potentially instructive extensions.
One venue is to introduce the dynamics that would endogenize the cost of debt or risk–premium,
the size of the debt stock, and potentially even the cost of default.
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